

Evolutionary Psychology

www.epjournal.net – 2012. 10(2): 198-209

Book Review

Round up the Usual Suspects

A review of Charles Murray, *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. Crown Forum: New York, 2010, 407 pp., US\$17.18, ISBN # 0307453421 (hardcover).

Bo Winegard, , Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, United States. Email: (Winegard@psy.fsu.edu).

Ben Winegard, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, United States. Email: (bmw8vb@mail.missouri.edu).

Turn the television to a political news channel and it is likely that, within a few minutes, you will hear one pundit or another fulminating about the increasing polarization of American society. Although the accused vary, all commentators seem to agree that American society is being torn asunder. Charles Murray's latest book, *Coming Apart*, agrees and, in fact, argues that Americans might be unaware of just how large the rift in society has grown. Although the book has obvious political and social ramifications, its interest to students of evolutionary psychology might be obscure. However, we believe that students of evolution should be interested in the book and in the larger phenomena that it discusses; furthermore, we believe that an evolutionarily informed perspective is an important and often missing voice in such cultural and political discussions. Evolutionary psychology may not be able to single-handedly solve or explain the myriad of problems that confront a society, but it can add a unique, interesting, and powerful method of analysis. We also note that evolutionary analyses and psychological accounts in general, do not substitute for structural and historical explanations. We doubt that evolutionary psychology has much to offer a curious individual interested in the rise and fall of Detroit's auto industry.

Murray's central thesis is difficult to pin down. Part of the problem is that most of Murray's book focuses on "what happened," while mostly ignoring the "whys" (p. 12). Unambiguously, Murray argues that the fabric of American society is being torn apart by a variety of social, political, and economic factors; however, Murray is not always clear about *exactly* how or why America is "coming apart." In what follows, we will attempt to give order to Murray's book and will present what we believe is his thesis, but we caution that this is a reconstruction and that other readers might have slightly different interpretations. Murray asserts that America is being driven apart by two fundamental groups: the new elite (the new upper class) and the new lower class. The elite are driving America apart because they are becoming more and more hermetic, more and more detached from the everyday realities of average

citizens; and the lower class, because they are gradually losing the “founding virtues” (p. 130) that, according to Murray, are required to maintain an engaged and functional civil society. This growing fissure, Murray warns, “will end what has made America *America*” (p. 11). The book is divided into three major sections. The first describes the formation and characteristics of the new upper class; the second, does the same with the new lower class; and the last offers a commentary on why these developments matter. In what follows, we will discuss and criticize Murray’s book, using evolutionary theory where germane. It is our contention that, like the new elite that Murray warns about, evolutionary psychology should not remain hermetically sealed in the academy.

The New Upper Class

Since 1960, according to Murray, a new elite subculture has been forming in America, one with drastically different values and lifestyles from the majority of Americans. This elite class is based on cognitive ability rather than family fortune and, unlike the old elite, the new elite share a roughly homogeneous culture. Murray divides this new elite into the narrow elite and the broad elite. The narrow elite are those who have “risen to jobs that directly affect the nation’s culture, economy, and politics” (p. 17). According to Murray this includes lawyers, judges, leading journalists, influential scholars, senior government administrators, politicians, and corporate executives. The broad elite are those who are successful and influential within a city or region (sometimes it is difficult to know whom Murray is referring to, but his basic target is clear enough). This includes local business elites, local television stars, prominent faculty, and city officials. Because of unprecedented wealth and geographic mobility, these elites have carved out social and geographical niches, largely secluding themselves from average Americans. This seclusion, according to Murray, has led to the creation of a distinct set of values and behaviors—and this, in turn, has created a sociologically interesting subculture.

Table 1. Developments leading to a new upper class

Root Cause: The increasing market value of brains. Cognitive ability is desired on the market.

The Enabler of this pattern: Wealth. The US has more wealth than ever before.

The Mechanism: The College sorting machine. Colleges sort by cognitive ability very well.

The Perpetuator: Homogamy. Those who are alike tend to marry each other.

Murray spends a considerable amount of time describing the values and lifestyles of the

new elite; and although he disapproves of many of their characteristics, sometimes allowing his moral scorn to distort his presentation, and sometimes appealing to the worst fears and easily accessible stereotypes (availability heuristic) of his readers (“Judge for yourself whether my generalizations correspond to your experience” pg. 36), his descriptions are not entirely inaccurate. The new elite are lifestyle “snobs” who read fancy literature, watch obscure films, and recycle; they practice yoga, eat organic foods, and jog daily; and, just as importantly, they are ignorant of, or actively denigrate, popular sports, popular television, rotary clubs, and other forms of popular entertainment and collective commitment. Improving their health, according to Murray, is only one of their desiderata- another is pridefully displaying their wholesome lifestyles and their “whippet-thin” bodies. Smoking and excessive drinking are not just health problems to the new elite; they are moral and lifestyle problems--signals of belonging to an inferior caste. Murray drives his points home with humorous, sometimes sardonic, observations.

While many of these lifestyle choices are salubrious, Murray believes that the aloofness and subtle moral and intellectual condescension of the new elite is problematic. He worries that many elites “have never lived outside the upper-middle-class bubble,” thus increasing the danger that those with “little direct experience with the lives of ordinary Americans” will make judgments based on their narrow experience of the world (pp. 100-102). Murray humorously presents the reader with a “How thick is your bubble?” quiz that includes questions such as “Who is Jimmie Johnson?” (Answer: a five-time NASCAR Sprint Cup champion), and “During the last month, have you voluntarily hung out with people who were cigarette smokers?” (pp. 103-105). This bubble, of course, is one that many of his readers are trapped in, and Murray’s point is to draw attention to just how alienated from mainstream America the average new elite, or even members of the upper-middle-class in general, really are.


Put in evolutionary and cognitive terms, the isolation that Murray describes results from the creation of a unique culture, a culture that is remote from and impenetrable to evolved folk domains (Geary, 2005). According to Geary, the mind consists of primary and secondary competencies. Primary competencies are automatically engaged cognitive skills that require little explicit instruction and develop uniformly in normal humans. Secondary competencies are cognitive skills that require explicit instruction and vary widely in humans. Those with higher general intelligence are better able to acquire and master esoteric secondary competencies (Geary, 2002). For example, everyday language, or the ability to verbally communicate, develops in all normal individuals without explicit training. However, the ability to use sophisticated, flowery, or jargon-laden language, or to speak in iambic pentameter, does not and requires effortful training and practice, although it does build from the scaffolding provided by the primary language competency. Educated and intelligent elites, then, often possess cognitive skills, interests, and desires that are not shared by less intelligent or less educated people (Kanazawa, 2010). For example, outside of these specialized niches, the *Twilight* films were incredibly popular whilst inside of these niches they were mocked for their simplicity and

treachery. Among the new cognitive elite, films that most haven't heard of or would consider painfully boring are lauded, including films such as *Citizen Kane* and *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Many similar examples could be adduced, but the basic pattern is the same. However, this emphasis on experiences and behaviors that rely upon secondary competencies does not ineluctably lead to uniformity of beliefs or moral values. And the very forces that allow the cognitive elite to splinter from mainstream society also allow them to splinter from each other.

According to Murray, although there are political differences among the elite, those differences are "swamped by the ways in which people occupying the elite positions in America have adopted similar norms and mores" (pg. 45). As we have noted, we believe that Murray exaggerates this similarity. In fact, evidence seems to show that, if anything, there is more contention and divisiveness *within* the upper classes (upper and upper middle class) than there is between the upper and lower classes. Before considering evolutionary reasons for this polarization, it might be useful to think of all of the people that Murray conveniently leaves out of his quasi-ethnographic account. Although these people fall under Murray's definition of the elite, his book virtually ignores the rich, charismatic leaders of mega-churches, the owners of professional sports' teams, the successful, church attending owners of small to middle sized businesses, the conservative executives and managers of corporations, and the not insignificant number of affluent and educated people who listen to Rush Limbaugh or Sean Hannity on the radio every day.

Consider some of the statistics. *Focus on the Family* founder, James Dobson, has an email list with 2.5 million subscribers (see Time Special on Influential Evangelicals, 2005). There are over 1,600 mega-churches in the United States with an average of 6 million worshippers per week, many of them very wealthy (Bird and Thumma, 2011). According to Michael Harrison, editor of *Talkers* magazine, Rush Limbaugh reaches 14.25 million listeners per week, while Sean Hannity reaches 13.25 million and Michael Savage, another 8.25 million listeners (Farhi, 2009). Again, many of these listeners are wealthy and well-educated, and, contrary to Murray's more extreme bubble accusations, 16% of NASCAR fans have incomes higher than \$100,000 (Ryan, 2009). This supports Andrew Gelman and colleagues' (2008) finding that it is the affluent who are in many ways more polarized than other segments of the population: "Throughout the country, lower-income Americans are shopping at discount stores, eating at McDonald's, and taking the bus. It's disposable income that allows you to choose between SUVs and hybrids, NASCAR and the opera, and so forth." (p. 93). Figure 1 shows that ideologically, the rich are further apart than the poor. Furthermore, Gelman (2012), contradicting many pundits and Murray's own insinuations, notes a strong correlation between income and voting for the Republican party, noting that to create a block of elite Democratic-voting whites you would need to find a group of postgraduates who had family incomes lower than \$75,000.

Figure 1. Economic and social ideology by income and state



Note: Retrieved from <http://andrewgelman.com/2012/02/some-reactions-to-charles-murrays-thoughts-on-income-and-politics/>. Used with the permission of the author.

There are also good evolutionary reasons to suppose that the elite would be polarized. As existential needs are satisfied by increasing security and wealth, people become more concerned with abstract and symbolic lifestyle values and self expression (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). These concerns are more flexible, more subject to individual differences, and more sensitive to environmental input than basic existential needs, therefore, they can easily cause conflict, especially when more universal desires are satisfied. In recent years, Jonathan Haidt has studied the kinds of moral differences that lead to contentious divisions. According to Haidt (2012a), people use six basic moral foundations to judge the behaviors and lifestyles of others. These judgments are not rational; rather, they are evolved propensities to react - viscerally and emotionally - to moral stimuli. Graham and Haidt (2008) believe that these moral foundations

might be one of the keys to understanding the conservative/liberal divide. Haidt (2012a) argues that liberals emphasize three foundations (care/harm, liberty/oppression, fairness/cheating) and conservatives emphasize not only those three but also three others (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation). These differences lead to different conceptions of how people should behave and to what ends society should promote such behaviors.

If Haidt's framework is more than a little true (and we suspect that it is), the contention and division among the elites is even more explicable. Consider two recent phenomena: the Tea Party and the Occupy movement. Contrary to popular opinion, the Tea Party was/is comprised of largely affluent and educated Americans (NYT/CBS News Poll, 2010; Zernike, 2010). The Occupy movement was/is also comprised of educated Americans; they are, on average, less affluent than the Tea Party, but many are young, some are still in school, and many have just graduated (Cordero-Guzman, 2011). Although one might argue that both movements are similar in many ways, like discontented blossoms born from the same soil, it is quite clear that they have many different desires. According to Haidt (2010), the two movements emphasize different aspects of the moral foundations. The Tea Party focuses on karmic fairness, arguing that people need to pull their own weight and shouldn't be sheltered by the government from the consequences of their actions. The Occupy movement, upon the other hand, focuses on liberal fairness, arguing that people should have equal (or close to equal) life outcomes and shouldn't be exploited by the powerful and more fortunate (Haidt, 2012b). Not surprisingly, both movements were praised and scorned, mostly along predictable lines (Fox News praised the Tea Party and denigrated the Occupy movement; MSNBC, the exact opposite). This illustrates a large fracture among the affluent and well-educated, something that Murray almost entirely ignores.

The New Lower Class

Murray argues that there are four "founding virtues" that are essential to the American project: honesty, industriousness, marriage, religiosity. In one of the weakest parts of the book, Murray attempts to connect these virtues to the Founding Fathers by cherry picking quotes and arguing that the Founders possessed a singular and unified moral vision for America- a vision that almost certainly did not exist (for discussion of the Founders, see Ellis, 2002). For the purposes of this review, his arguments here are irrelevant; what is relevant is that he emphasizes the importance of the four founding virtues, believing that they form a guiding light that has kept American society together and prosperous since its inception: "The success of America depended on virtue in the people when the country began and it still does in the twenty-first century" (p. 143). Murray argues that the new lower class is rapidly losing these virtues, and that the new upper class, although still adhering to them, is too detached or too non-judgmental to preach them to the lower class. For Murray, the new lower class, because they lack these important virtues, "can destroy the kind of civil society that America requires" (p. 209).

To analyze the moral virtues- or lack of virtues- of the new working class, Murray creates two fictional populations: Fishtown and Belmont (the real Fishtown is a working class neighborhood in Philadelphia, and the real Belmont is an upper-middle class suburb in Boston). Murray accomplishes this by using data from the GSS (general social survey), the CPS (current population survey) and the NLS (national longitudinal surveys; for more details, see pp. 321-336). Belmont consists of people who have at least a bachelor's degree and who work in high prestige professions, in management, or who are married to those who do. Fishtown consists of people who possess no more than a high school diploma, who work in either blue-collar jobs, mid or low-level service jobs, or low-level white-collar jobs (p. 146). This statistical breakdown enables Murray to analyze a pure sample. Later, he carries out a quasi-ethnographic analysis of the real Fishtown, concluding that it is quite similar to his statistical Fishtown.

Industriousness (pp. 168-188)

In Fishtown, industriousness has been declining since the late 60's. An increasing number of men are out of the labor market, and those who are working are working fewer hours per week. Men in Fishtown have also increased their leisure time by eight and a half hours per week from 1985 to 2005, spending that time sleeping and watching television. In Belmont, industriousness is roughly the same as it was in 1970, leading Murray to conclude that "white males of the 2000's were less industrious than they had been twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago and...the decay in industriousness occurred overwhelmingly in Fishtown" (p. 181).

Honesty (pp. 189-199)

In Fishtown, honesty, as measured by arrest and prisoner rates, has been declining since the 70's. In other words, arrests and prisoner rates have gone up, indicating to Murray that personal integrity and honesty have gone down. As with industriousness, the pattern of decline in honesty was nearly absent from Belmont.

Marriage (pp. 149-167)

In Fishtown, marriage is also declining. The number of people getting married has been declining since the late 60's while the number of people getting divorced or reporting unhappy marriages has been increasing. These troubles have led to more children born to or raised by single parent families. As with the other virtues, there is a disparity in the decline between Belmont and Fishtown, leading Murray to assert:

"The divergence is so large that it puts the women of Belmont and Fishtown into different family cultures. The absolute level in Fishtown is so low that it calls into question the viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next generation." (p. 167)

Religiosity (pp. 200-208).

Although there has been a strong secular trend of declining religiosity in America as a whole, religious disengagement in Fishtown has increased more than in Belmont. According to Murray, “America is still exceptional in this regard (religious attendance); it is just less religious than it used to be” (p. 205). Murray points out that this is at odds with the intuitive view that the upper class in America has become less religious and the lower class more. Murray also corrects the misconception that working class fundamentalism is dramatically increasing, noting that “32 percent of Fishtown was fundamentalist in the 1970s, and 34 percent was in the 2000s- in effect, no change” (p. 207).

Whereas the first part of Murray’s book is often illuminating and thought provoking, even if ultimately incomplete, this part is almost unforgivably superficial. Murray spends most of it reciting the moral failings of the new lower class, hardly bothering to place his degradation into an explanatory framework. He ignores or dismisses important social factors such as the decline of unions and the decline of well-paying jobs (Cowie, 2010; Western and Rosenfeld, 2011), asserting:

“High-paying unionized jobs have become scarce and real wages for all kinds of blue-collar jobs have been stagnant or falling since the 1970s. But these trends don't explain why Fishtown men in the 2000s worked fewer jobs, found it harder to get jobs than other Americans did, and more often dropped out of the labor market than they had in the 1960s. On the contrary: *Insofar as men need to work to survive* - an important proviso - falling hourly income does not discourage work.” (p. 178) (emphasis in original)

Murray then provides a hypothetical example:

“Put yourself in the place of a Fishtown man who is at the bottom of the labor market, qualified only for low-skill jobs. You may wish you could make as much as your grandfather made working on a General Motors assembly line in the 1970s. You may be depressed because you’ve been trying to find a job and failed. But if a job driving a delivery truck, or being a carpenter’s helper, or working on a cleaning crew for an office building opens up, why would a bad labor market for blue-collar jobs keep you from taking it?...Why would you not work a full forty hours if the hours were available? Why not work more than forty hours?” (pp. 178-179)

Most of the time, Murray poses as a dispassionate observer- a kind of Dante traveling through the circles of hell- of this moral decline, merely reporting the story the data tell, but later

in the book, he offers an explicit glimpse at his (mostly) implicit narrative. According to Murray, science will, in the not very distant future, prove that the welfare state is untenable (pp. 298-301). Not surprisingly, it is this welfare state that Murray holds accountable for the increasing listlessness, indolence, dishonesty, and civic detachment of the new lower class. Specifically, according to Murray, the moral decline of the new lower class is caused by the willingness of the state to supply the basic needs of a family, vitiating the honor and pride that supporting a family once offered a man:

“A man who is holding down a menial job and thereby supporting a wife and children is doing something authentically important with his life. He should take deep satisfaction from that, and be praised by his community for doing so. If that same man lives under a system that says the children of the woman he sleeps with will be taken care of whether or not he contributes, then that status goes away...Taking the trouble out of life strips people of major ways in which human beings look back on their lives and say “I made a difference.”” (p. 283).

It is not, then, the decline of decent salaried jobs or the decline of the community of unions, but rather the rise of the welfare state that is causing the slow decay of lower class values. Using a crude, but perhaps appropriate, *reductio ad absurdum*, Murray’s argument seems to favor a return to a time when just providing another day’s worth of food would be lauded because life was precarious and starvation was an ever present possibility. One can easily use his argument to disparage most transitions (progressions) of civilization (see Pinker, 2011, for a discussion of the progress of society and morality). Furthermore, as a matter of historical fact, the years that Murray focuses on were associated with a widespread attack on the welfare state; the apogee of the welfare state, on the other hand, was associated with low(er) levels of inequality between Belmont and Fishtown and a relative paucity of the problems that Murray (rightfully) bemoans (Wilentz, 2009).

Before concluding, we would like to forward a brief and evolutionarily plausible explanation for the problems Murray documents. Humans are cultural animals and invest heavily in cognitive and symbolic capital (Baumeister, 2005; Hill and Kaplan, 1999). From a life-history perspective, such investments entail a number of trade-offs. If a particular culture does not offer an obvious path to long term status and success, the people in it will choose shorter investment strategies. The new lower class has largely lost the opportunity to procure a decent paying factory job. Such jobs, at one time, conferred healthy amounts of status and unions provided important social capital, allowing an uneducated worker to live a comfortable and respectable life (Shipler, 2005). Without these jobs, an important avenue of status is removed from society, and those who would have occupied them are forced to take low status jobs; jobs that provoke the scorn of most who can avoid them. Furthermore, these low status jobs do not offer mobility.

A thirtysomething Wal-Mart cashier cannot reasonably expect that his hard work will be rewarded with consistent raises and promotions, terminating, perhaps, in a solid management job. Thus the new lower class is deprived of opportunities for engaging in long-term (or even medium-term) cultural strategies. Understandably, then, they turn their attention to short-term strategies, competing for immediate rewards and ephemeral boosts in status and self esteem (Bageant, 2008; Pyszynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, and Schimel, 2004). Concurrently, those who can invest in long-term strategies battle each other for dominance of the cultural narrative (because this confers status), and their concerns become further removed from those of the average American.

Conclusion

Murray's book addresses a serious and pressing problem: the growing division(s) in American society. However, we believe that it ignores or downplays the importance of many developments in the past 40 years, including the decline of unions, the slow but constant shedding of a decent safety net, the loss of decent paying jobs for relatively uneducated citizens, and the loss of the important status-conferring benefits those jobs provided. We also believe that his description of the new upper class is mistaken. Whether consciously or not, Murray's new upper class reads more like a conservative's nightmare than like a dispassionate description of the data; consequently, it perpetuates an erroneous but popular and useful narrative. In fact, the picture it paints is not too far from the picture one can view on Fox News every night, replete with wine sipping, Proust reading, supercilious liberals pushing their bizarre agenda upon an unwitting and reluctant populace. Nevertheless, Murray's narrative is true enough to merit reflection. And, for whatever the flaws, the book is a serious attempt to grapple with a potentially urgent problem, and for that we should be thankful.

References

- Bageant, J. (2008). *Deer hunting with Jesus: Dispatches from America's class war*. Portland, OR: Broadway.
- Baumeister, R. F. (2005). *The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bird, W., and Thumma, S. (2011). A new decade of megachurches: 2011 profile of large attendance churches in the United States. *Hartford Institute for Religion Research*. Retrieved March 23, 2012, from <http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/New-Decade-of-Megachurches-2011Profile.pdf>.
- Codero-Guzman, H. (2011, October 19). Mainstream support for a mainstream movement: Profile of web traffic take from occupywallst.org. Retrieved March 20, 2012, from <http://occupywallst.org/media/pdf/OWS-profile1-10-18-11-sent-v2-HRCG.pdf>

- Cowie, J. (2010). *Stayin' alive: The 1970s and the last days of the working class*. New York: The New Press.
- Ellis, J. (2002). *Founding brothers: The revolutionary generation*. New York: Vintage.
- Farhi, P. (2009, March 7). Limbaugh's audience size? It's largely up in the air. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved March 21, 2012, from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/06/AR2009030603435.html>
- Geary, D. C. (2002). Principles of evolutionary educational psychology. *Learning and Individual Differences, 12*, 317-345.
- Geary, D. C. (2005). *The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Gelman, A. (2012, March 23). Voting patterns of America's whites, from the masses to the elites. *Statistical Modelling, Causes Inference, and Social Science*. Retrieved March 24, 2012, from <http://andrewgelman.com/2012/03/voting-patterns-of-americas-whites-from-the-masses-to-the-elites/>.
- Gelman, A., Park, D., Shor, B., Bafumi, J., and Cortina, J. (2008). *Red state, blue state, rich state, poor state: Why Americans vote the way they do*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Graham, J., and Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14*, 140-150.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., and Nose, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96*, 1029-1046.
- Haidt, J. (2010, October 16). What the Tea Partiers really want. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved March 15, 2012, from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703673604575550243700895762.html#printMode>
- Haidt, J. (2012a). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon.
- Haidt, J. (2012b, January). The moral foundations of Occupy Wall Street: An illustrated guide to the signs at Zuccotti Park. Retrieved February 14, 2012, from <http://reason.com/archives/2011/12/30/the-moral-foundations-of-occupy-wall-str/singlepage>.
- Hill, K., and Kaplan, H. (1999). Life history traits in humans: Theory and empirical studies. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 28*, 397-430.
- Inglehart, R., and Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanazawa, S. (2010). Why liberals and atheists are more intelligent. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*, 33-57.

- New York Times/CBS News (2010, April 14). *Polling the Tea Party*. Retrieved January 18, 2011, from <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/04/14/us/politics/20100414-tea-party-poll-graphic.html#tab=0>
- Pinker, S. (2011). *The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined*. New York: Viking.
- Pyszynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., and Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 130, 435-468.
- Ryan, N. (2009, July 1). Identity crisis: Can NASCAR reach old, new fans effectively? *USA Today*. Retrieved March 21, 2012, from http://www.usatoday.com/sports/motor/nascar/2009-07-01-nascar-identity-crisis_N.htm
- Shipler, D. K. (2005). *The working poor: Invisible in America*. New York: Vintage.
- Time Staff (2005, February 7). The 25 most influential evangelicals in America. *Time*. Retrieved March 23, 2012, from <http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/0,28757,1993235,00.html>
- Western, B., and Rosenfeld, J. (2011). Unions, norms, and the rise in U.S. wage inequality. *American Sociological Review*, 76, 513-537.
- Wilentz, S. (2009). *The age of Reagan: A history, 1974-2008*. New York: Harper.
- Zernike, K. (2010). *Boiling mad: Inside tea party America*. New York: Times Books.